IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is a Cross-Appeal against parts of the decisions in the Ruling of the Federal High Court Yola dated 13th January, 2012 but delivered by His Lordship S. M. Shauibu, J. on the 20th day of January, 2012 in suit No:FH/YL/CS/50/2011, whereby he struck out the 1st Cross-Respondent's suit challenging the primary election and nomination of the Cross-Appellant as the Candidate of the 2nd Cross-Respondent for the 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Adamawa State; on grounds of non-compliance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended); the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended); the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Constitution and Guidelines for Primary Elections of the 2nd Cross-Respondent. The 1st Cross-Respondent had sought for declaratory and injunctive Reliefs as encapsulated in his Statement of Claim on the Grounds articulated in Paragraph 47 thereof and upon being served and as earlier stated in the main Appeal, the Cross-Appellant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection to the competence of the suit and against the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain same amongst other grounds. See page 3 of the Cross Appellant's Brief particularly paragraph 1.05 and 1.06 where the issues formulated as arising from the preliminary objection and for determination of the lower court are reproduced.

At the hearing of the preliminary objection, the learned Counsel for the respective parties adopted their written Addresses and the learned trial Judge ruled on the 20th day of January, 2012, dismissing the Appellant/1st Cross-Respondent's suit on the grounds that the complaints of the 1st Cross-Respondent were not on the conduct of the party primaries but were on matters that occurred before the conduct of 

the said primaries and as such the complaints were not such as envisaged by the provisions of Section 87(9) and (10) of the Electoral Act, 2010.

The first grouse of the Cross-Appellant herein is that in spite of the fact that the Court below had rightly held as above, the learned trial Judge nevertheless overruled the Cross-Appellant on the contention of the Cross-Appellant that the 1st Cross-Respondent's complaints fell within the domestic and internal affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent (the Peoples Democratic Party). Secondly, the other grouse of the Cross-Appellant is that the 1st Cross-Respondent, did not first of all appeal to the 2nd Respondent's Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal panel as required by Article 22(g) - (h) of the Electoral Guidelines of the 2nd Cross-Respondent which he reproduced at page 4 of the Cross-Appellant's Brief of Argument and which copy of the Guidelines he had Exhibited as Exhibit PDP1 to the Affidavit in support of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Notice of Preliminary Objection as can be found at pages 409 - 442 of the Record of Appeal.

Against this second aspect of the Cross-Appellant's objection, the Court ruled at page 849 of the Records as to whether the condition precedent for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction had been fulfilled since the 1st Cross-Respondent had not submitted his grievances to the said Appeal panel; that the condition precedent had been so fulfilled. Dissatisfied with the position taken by the learned trial Judge, the Cross-Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal dated 2nd March, 2012, on the same day through his learned Senior Counsel K. G. Agabi (CON), SAN. The Notice of Appeal with two Grounds is contained in pages 875 and 876 of the Record of proceedings. Upon transmission of the Records hereto, parties exchanged their respective Briefs of Argument and in the Brief settled by Ayo Akam, Esq. for the Appellant, two Issues have been raised as falling for determination couched in the following terms:-
"1. Whether the Court below was not in error when it held that the complaints of the 1st Cross Respondent do not fall within the domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent (Ground 2).

"2. Whether lodging complaints or grievances to 2nd Cross-Respondent's Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel was not a condition precedent for seeking redress in Court and if it was whether the Court below was not in error when it held that the 1st Cross-Respondent had no obligation to lodge his complaints or grievances to the Gubernatorial Electoral Panel of the 2nd Cross Respondent (Ground 1)".

On his part, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Cross Respondent Sylvester Imhanobe, Esq. in the 1st Cross-Respondent's Brief adopted the issues formulated by the learned Counsel for the Cross- Appellant.

ARGUMENTS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL ON THE ISSUES FORMULATED.
"1. WHETHER THE COURT BELOW WAS NOT IN ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COMPLAINTS OF THE 1ST CROSS-RESPONDENT DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE DOMESTIC OR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE 2ND CROSS-RESPONDENT (GROUND 2)."

In his argument on this first issue the learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant drew our attention to the history of intra party contests including the selection and nomination of candidates for public offices prior to the enactment of the Electoral Act, 2010 which were in law purely the domestic affairs of the political party and not for the Court's to decide. Abdulkadir v. Mamman (2003) NWLR (pt.834) at 30 C.A. per Oyedemi, JCA; Akpan v. Bob (2010) 17 NWLR (pt. 1223) 421 at 501; per Muhammad, JSC; were cited to submit that with the enactment of Section 87(10) of Electoral Act, there is a slight change that the Courts now have the jurisdiction to determine matters relating to breaches of the provisions of the Electoral Act and the Guidelines of political parties for primary elections where the breaches are shown to have been committed in the selection and nomination of a party's candidates for election.

In the view of learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant, the provision of Section 87(10) of the Act now draws a distinction between complaints which are still within the domestic and internal affairs of a political party, of which the Courts cannot interfere and complaints which are outside the domestic affairs of a party by virtue of their being acts upon which the jurisdiction of the Court can be invoked. Referring us to the claim of the 1st Respondent in paragraph 47(a-c) of his Statement of claim at page 15 of the Record of Appeal, it was further submitted that the Court in its Ruling found that the above complaints of the 1st Cross-Respondent were on matters not envisaged by the provisions of Section 87(10) and as such the Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere and determine the suit. He cited and reproduced the finding of the court at page 825 of the Records and highlighted each of the heads of the 1st Cross-Respondent's grouse in the lower Court that necessitated the institution of the suit thereat and which he analysed seriatim and concluded that all of those grievances are not allegations in the conduct of a primary election nor are they allegations that any of the provisions of the Constitution of the 2nd Cross-Respondent and the Guidelines for Primary Election, 2010; had been breached in the course of the conduct of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Primary Election.

We were then urged to hold that the Court below was right when it held that the complaints of the Appellant were not matters envisaged by the provisions of Sections 87(9) and (10) but was in error to have held that the matters complained of are not within the domestic and internal affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent. This is because matters, for which no jurisdiction is conferred on the Court to adjudicate on, must certainly be matters which the law left exclusively to the political parties and we were further urged to so hold particularly if we take into consideration the decision of the learned trial Judge at pages 824-825 of the Records.

Finally on this point, the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant took the view that by the finding/decision of the learned trial Judge in the pages of the Record of proceedings above cited, it implies that a complaint not related to conduct of primaries for selection and nomination of a candidate of a political party, is not envisaged by Sections 87(9) and (10) and if the Court below so held, then it would have upheld the Cross-Appellant's submission that the subject matter was not such that the jurisdiction of the Court could be invoked, and secondly the contention of the Cross-Appellant that those complaints were on matters within the domestic affairs of the 2nd cross-Respondent of which the court below lacked the jurisdiction to interfere.

Reacting to the above submission the learned counsel for the 1st cross-Respondent, Mr Imhanobe conceded to the arguments of the learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant to the extent only of the position of the law prior to the enactment of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010; but argued on the contrary that the learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant erred when he contended that the enactment distinguished complaints which are still within the domestic affairs of the political party of which the courts cannot interfere and those envisaged by Section 87(10) which the Court's jurisdiction can be invoked.

Learned counsel for the 1st Cross-Respondent then adopted his argument in paragraphs 1.5 to 1.2 of the Appellant's Brief on the correct interpretation of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 which he also reproduced and in answer to the question raised by the Cross-Appellant in issue Number 1; submitted 

that the answer is contained in the portion of the wordings of Section 87(9) as underlined i.e. "any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party." He added that his complaint in the lower court as contained in the statement of claim is that the 2nd Cross-Respondent (Peoples Democratic party) is in breach of the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and the party Guidelines in the process for the nomination of the Gubernatorial candidate of the party in Adamawa State in 2012 Gubernatorial Election. He maintained that the word "any" as used in Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, means "all".

Finally, on this issue, the learned counsel for the 1st Cross-Respondent contended on the distinction by the Appellant between complaints which are still within the domestic affairs of the Political parties of which the courts are stripped of jurisdiction and those which are outside the internal affairs of party, that the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant does not represent the correct position of the law. We were then urged to affirm the decision of the learned trial Judge on the issue and hold that the Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act has changed the law and that Courts have unfettered power to inquire whether a political party conducted its primary in full compliance with the Electoral Act, the Constitution of the Political Party and the Guidelines for the Primary Election of the Political Party.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NUMBER ONE (1)
I have carefully considered the submissions of Counsel on this Issue and am of the candid view that although prima facie it may appear that Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act does not dichotomize between acts or complaints on events that occurred before or during the election, because of the use of the words "any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party, what qualifies the words underlined by the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st Cross-Respondent is that the breach or non-compliance should be "in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election".
The word 'in' has been defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (7th Edition) at pages 751 and 752 as "during a period of time" "involved in something", "taking part in something" and so on. From the definition of the word "in" above and as used in the Section of the Electoral Act now the subject of interpretation the only distinction or qualifying factor is participation by the aspirant and it seems to me that where an aspirant contested a primary election, whether he complains of pre-acts of non-compliance or inactions of the political party during the election which resulted in breaches of the Electoral Act or the Constitution of the political party and its Guidelines for primary election; he is qualified to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act.

For purposes of emphasis, let me once more cite the case of NDIC v. Okem Enterprises (2004) 10 NWLR (pt. 880) 107 at 182 para. H; where the word 'notwithstanding' as used in Section 87(9) was judicially defined by Uwaifo, JSC; while interpreting the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution that deals with the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as connoting thus:

"When the term 'notwithstanding' is used in a section of a statute, it is meant to exclude an impinging or impeding effect of any other provision of the statute or other subordinate legislation so that the said section may fulfill itself. It follows that as used in Section 251(1) of the Constitution, no provision of that Constitution shall be capable of undermining the said section."
Again, in the most recent decision of the Supreme Court on intra party squabbles particularly on nomination or selection of a party's candidate for elections into public offices, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC reiterated what he said in Hope Uzodinma v. Senator O. Izunaso (2011) Vol. 5 (pt. 1) MJSC p.11; (No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (pt.1275) 30; when he interpreted Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, thus:-

"A person who was not a candidate/aspirant at the primaries cannot come to the Court to complain about the conduct of the primaries. See Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) Vol.1 14 NSCC P. 494; (1983) 2 SCNLR 244; Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt.843) P. 310; PDP v. T. Sylva & 2 Ors. (2012) 13 NWLR (pt.1316) 85.

But where the political party conducts its primaries and a dissatisfied contestant of the said primaries complains about the conduct of the primaries, the Courts have jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act to examine if the primaries were conducted in accordance with the Electoral Act, the Constitution and the Guidelines of the Party. The reason is simple. The Courts will not allow a political party to act arbitrarily or as it likes. A political Party must obey its own Constitution. See Emeka v. Okadigbo (2012) 18 NWLR (pt. 1331) 55 at 88 paras. F - G.
At page 90 of the Report para. G. His Lordship reiterated that "The emergence of the 1st Respondent as the PDP Candidate for the Senatorial Elections cannot be questioned by the Appellant, since he never contested the primaries from which the 1st Respondent emerged."

From the above decisions it is clear that what determines the locus standi of a person to challenge the breach of the Electoral Act, the party's Constitution and the Guidelines of a political party as in this case, is his/her participation as a candidate or contestant in the primary election. Again from the word 'in' as used by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010; it would appear that the subject matter of the complaint must be the breach of the Constitution of the party and the Electoral Guidelines at the time of the contest not prior or before such Primary Election was conducted. The analogy drawn by the learned Counsel on the distinction between events that occurred before the primary of which the Court would have no jurisdiction is accordingly true for the purpose of this case since from the pleadings of the Cross-Respondent all his complaints were based on discriminatory membership revalidation in which his supporters were excluded, refusal of the 2nd Cross-Respondent to sell Delegates Nomination Forms to them which denied them the opportunity to be elected Ad-Hoc Delegates at the primaries of 24th October, 2011 and lack of valid Notice to the 1st Cross-Respondent or to his supporters and Campaign Organisation on the date of Ward Congress of the 21st day of October, 2011; which are all events not connected with the 2nd Cross-Respondent primary election held on the 24th of October, 2011 for the selection/nomination of her candidate for 2012 General Election.

Thus, the Court below rightly divested itself of the jurisdiction to entertain the Cross-Appellant's suit. However, if Appellant had participated in/contested the primary election the Court would have assumed jurisdiction to hear the complaints of the Appellant and/or determine the matter on the merit, if at all. The submission by learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant therefore, that matters for which the Courts have no jurisdiction are vested exclusively on the political parties to determine, is unassailable and right because as the complaints in this case that warranted the institution of this action now on Appeal are matters not within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Appellant had the discretion to approach the party for redress. This is because to a large extent the jurisdiction of the Courts as donated by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act for aspirant to challenge their political party elections is limited to intra party matters/or disputes like the one at hand which emanated from the primary election of the 2nd Cross-Appellant to select or nominate the party's candidate for the Governorship Election of 2012.
See again Emeka v. Okadigbo (supra) per Adekeye, JSC at 106 paras. D - F and H to page 107 para. A; who remarked on this vexed issue that: "The position still remains intact that the issue of nomination or sponsorship of an election candidate is within the domestic affairs of the political parties and the Courts have no jurisdiction to nominate for a political party its candidate for any election Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244; Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt.842) P.310. The Court however is duty bound to interpret the law as made by the legislature so as to determine whether or not in the exercise of its rights of sponsorship or nomination the political party has complied with the relevant provisions of the law laid down for the conduct of the primaries in the present dispensation under the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended". The emeritus Law Lord then went on to reproduce the provisions of Section 87(1) and (9) of the Electoral Act and added that: "The Courts both the Federal High Court or State High Court and in the Appeal to the Court, are competent to determine whether the relevant provisions of the party Constitution and electoral guidelines have been followed in the choice of the candidate."

From the foregoing dictum of His Lordship, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the Courts to pry into the internal affairs of the 2nd Respondent is limited and circumscribed by the provision of Section 87(1), (4) (b)(ii) and (9) of the Election Act, 2010, in the case of Governorship primary elections of the party. This point is buttressed by the dictum of Fabiyi, JSC at page 104 paras. F - G of the above cited case when he asserted:-
"The Court is however vested with limited and thin jurisdiction which can be ignited under the provision of Section 87(4)(b)(ii),(c) (ii) and (g) of the Electoral Act (as amended). The Section imbues the National Executive Committee of the party with the vires to organise and conduct the primaries. A candidate who took part in such a primary and is aggrieved can complain before the Court..." Going by the dicta of their Lordships in the Emeka v. Okadigbo's case, it would appear that the jurisdiction of Courts to question party primaries for the nomination of candidates to carry their flags at the General Elections into Public Offices is not at large in that the parties still have the prerogative or call it the exclusive jurisdiction in areas which have not been donated to the Court and aspirants by Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, to challenge the breach of the party Constitution and Guidelines; and accordingly resort must be had by aggrieved aspirants or candidates to the internal disputes resolution mechanism set up by the party Constitution and the Guidelines of the Political Parties as far as nomination or selection of candidates are concerned. See Lado v. CPC (2012) ALL FWLR at page 263 paras. G - H to 624 para. A; per Onnoghen, JSC also at page 627 paras. F - H, 638 paras. A - C; Emenike v. PDP (2012) 12 NWLR (pt. 1315) 556; Onuoha v. Okafor (supra) Okadigbo v. Emeka (2012) 11 NWLR (pt. 1311) 237; Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (pt.1275) 30.

Also the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant was therefore on very sound pedestal to have argued that where the Court below had held at pages 851 to 852 of the Record, that for the Plaintiff/Appellant to successfully invoke the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010:
(a) the complaint must be in relation to the conduct of primaries for the selection or nomination of a candidate for an election by a political party;
(b) but that in the case at hand the complaints of Plaintiff/1st Cross-Respondent as could be seen in paragraph 47 of the Statement of claim, were complaints on matters that had arisen before the conduct of the primaries leading to the emergence of the 1st Defendant/Cross-Appellant as a candidate of the 2nd Cross-Respondent;
(c) and that the Court below having found that the jurisdiction of the court could not be invoked, pursuant to Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act; the implication is that complaints which are not in relation to conduct of primaries for the nomination of candidates for a political party, are not envisaged by Section 87(9). I therefore, totally agree with learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant that the Court below would have upheld (his) the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant's contention that those complaints were within the domestic affairs of the 2nd Cross-Respondent, which the court below had no competence to interfere.
The above notwithstanding, the holding by the learned trial Judge which is the subject of this issue has not occasioned any miscarriage of justice to the Cross-Appellant since the Court below still struck out the Plaintiff/1st Cross-Respondent's case for want of jurisdiction. This Ground of Appeal and the Issue arising there from is therefore academic and without any utilitarian value to the Cross-Appellant although it is hereby resolved in his favour.

ISSUE NUMBER 2 (TWO): "WHETHER LODGING COMPLAINTS OR GRIEVANCES TO CROSS-APPELLANTS' GUBERNATORIAL ELECTORAL APPEAL PANEL OF THE 2ND CROSS-RESPONDENT WAS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR SEEKING REDRESS IN COURT AND IF IT WAS WHETHER THE COURT BELOW WAS NOT IN ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE 1ST CROSS-RESPONDENT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO LODGE HIS COMPLAINTS OR GRIEVANCES TO THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTORAL APPEAL PANEL OF THE 2ND CROSS-RESPONDENT.

Arguing this issue, the learned counsel for the Cross-Appellant drew our attention to two of the Grounds of the Notice of preliminary objection before the lower Court which amongst others were:-
"1. That the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action in that the Plaintiff (now 1st Cross-Respondent) failed to comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Party 2009 (as amended) and the Electoral Guidelines for primary Elections, 2010 for the resolution of party dispute arising from primary elections.
"2. A condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction has not been fulfilled in that the Plaintiff did not lodge any appeal against the election and nomination of the 1st Defendant to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Defendant."

The learned Counsel also reproduced the issues formulated in the lower Court for determination of the preliminary objection which were that:-
"1. This Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action in that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party 2009 (as amended) and the Electoral Guidelines for primary Elections 2010 for the resolution of party dispute arising from primary election.
"2. A condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction has not been fulfilled in that the plaintiff did not lodge any appeal against the election and nomination of the 1st Defendant to the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel of the 2nd Defendant."

The learned Counsel referred us to Article 22(g)-(h) of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Constitution and submitted that as part of the primary election process for the selection or nomination of the 2nd Respondent's candidate for the Governorship election in Adamawa State, it was required under Article 22(g-h) of the 2nd Cross-Respondent's Electoral Guidelines for Primary Election, 2010, that an aggrieved aspirant should lodge an appeal to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel-a body set up by the 2nd Cross-Respondent to look into complaints of Governorship aspirants on the conduct of Governorship Primary Election. The Guidelines according to learned Counsel is found in Exhibit PDP 1 at page 409 - 442 of the Records.

It was his contention that the 1st Cross-Respondent ought to have lodged his complaints or grievances with the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel before proceeding to Court which he did not do but the Court below held that the 1st Cross-Respondent had no obligation so to do (page 849 of the Records refers). On the import of the provisions of Article 22(e)-(h) of Guidelines, the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant argued that the above Article provides party members opportunity to first exhaust the internal remedy before recourse is had to Court and do not in any way prevent or bar an aspirant from seeking redress in the Court if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the Appeal panel.

Citing the cases of UNILORIN v. Oluwadare 27 NSCQR 18 at 44 paras. F - G (SC); Owoseni v. Faloye (2005) ALL FWLR (pt. 284) 220 at 224 (S.C), Orakul Resources Ltd. v. NCC (2007) 16 NWLR (pt.1060) 270 at 302 and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR (pt. 341) 348; the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant contended that the 1st Cross-Respondent ought to have exhausted the internal dispute resolution machinery before having recourse to Court and in not so doing 'jumped the gun' when he rushed to Court without exhausting that machinery for redress available to him within the domestic forum and the Court below ought to have so held that the 1st Cross-Respondent jumped the gun. In the same vein, the learned Counsel took the view that the Court below ought to have declared the Cross-Respondent's suit bad for incompetence and that the failure to fulfill a condition precedent to the initiation of the action was fatal to the action as it robbed the Court of the jurisdiction to entertain the action.

The learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant went on to argue on the essence of primary election and the fact that the hearing of an Appeal by the Electoral Appeal Panel terminates the election or nomination process unless one of the aspirants concedes to the decision based on the counting of votes cast by the delegates at the primary election. He therefore insisted that it was obligatory to first of all lodge an appeal with the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal panel of the 2nd Respondent before seeking redress in the Court. Again, in his view, the hearing of an appeal for an Aspirant by the Electoral Appeal Panel under Article 22(g) and (h) relates to the nomination of a party candidate and where the panel fails or refuses to entertain an appeal lodged by an Aspirant under the above Article, such a refusal would be considered non-compliance with the provisions of the Guidelines.

Mr. Akam was of the further view that if we agree with the above position, then the 1st Cross-Respondent was bound to comply with the provisions of the above Articles of the Guidelines just as the 2nd Cross-Respondent would be expected to hear appeals lodged by Aspirants to the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel, and the Aspirants are expected to first lodge Appeals with the panel where not satisfied with results of primary election after counting the votes. He submitted further that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands and as such the 1st Cross-Respondent had a duty to show that he had exhausted all internal remedies available to him before approaching the Court and having failed so to do, he could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act more so as the Act does not provide that an aggrieved person should not first exhaust the internal remedy available to him before seeking redress in the Court.

On the phrase, "Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of political party" as employed by the law makers in Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, he submitted that it only operates against provisions in the Act or rules which oust the jurisdiction of the Court from entertaining actions instituted by aggrieved Aspirants which is not the case in the circumstance for according to him, nowhere is it provided by the Act that an aspirant shall not approach the Court if not satisfied with the decision of the Gubernatorial Appeal Panel. Citing again Chinwo v. Owhonda (2008) 3 NWLR (pt. 1074) 341 at 351 paras. C - H (CA); he maintained that as a member of a political party, the 1st Cross-Respondent was bound by the provisions of Articles 22 (g) and (h) of the Guidelines.

Accordingly, we were finally urged to set aside parts of the decision or Ruling of the Court below dated 13th January, 2012 but delivered on the 20th January, 2012, wherein the learned trial Judge held that 
complaints of the 1st Cross-Respondent cannot be domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Defendant and further that the 1st Cross-Respondent had no obligation to lodge his complaints or grievances with the Gubernatorial Electoral Appeal Panel of the 2nd Cross-Respondent. In conclusion, we were also urged to allow the Cross-Appeal and affirm the decision of the Court below declining jurisdiction in the matter on the two Grounds of Cross-Appeal.

Responding to the above arguments of the learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant, Mr. Imhanobe for the 1st Cross-Respondent in his terse submission urged that the arguments of the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant on Article 22 (e) and (h) of the Guidelines for Primary Elections of the 2nd Cross-Respondent must fail because they fail to take cognizance of the fact that the provision of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act starts with the words "Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party...." Apart from the foregoing, the learned Counsel for the Cross-Respondent argued that in the hierarchy of laws, the Guidelines are inferior to the Act and by the word "Notwithstanding" used in the Act, it subordinates the Guidelines to the Act.

For the above submission he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Appeal No.CA/YL/31/2011 - Peoples Democratic Party v. Senator Dahiru Gassol (unreported) judgment of this Court delivered on the 3th day of September, 2011; where the Court held that the consideration of a complaint of breach of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) or Guidelines on selection or nomination of a candidate for election by a Panel, Committee or other body established by the Rules or Guidelines of a political party, is invalid for hindering the right of access to Court by a citizen in view of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).

The learned Counsel for the 1st Cross-Respondent concluded his submission on this Cross Appeal by dismissing all the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the Cross-Appellant as irrelevant to the main question arising from the issues in this Cross Appeal as every case must be treated on its own merit. He therefore took the view that the word "Notwithstanding...." in Section