In The Court of Appeal
(Owerri Judicial Division)
On Tuesday, the 12th day of December, 2006
Suit No: CA/PH/191/2003
Before Their Lordships
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MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, |
....... Justice, Court of Appeal |
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MONICA BOLNA' AN DONGBAN -MENSEM, |
....... Justice, Court of Appeal |
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IBRAHM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, |
....... Justice, Court of Appeal |
Between
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I. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IMO STATE |
Appellants |
And
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GODWIN ONYEMA ANUFOROM |
Respondents |
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RATIO DECIDENDI |
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APPEAL - FILING/ENTERING APPEAL: Whether an appeal will be deemed to have been brought when the notice of appeal has been filed in the registry of the trial court |
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"It is trite that by virtue of order 3 Rule 5 of the court of Appeal Rule, 2002, an appeal shall be deemed to have been duly brought when the notice of appeal has been filed in the Registry of the court below. For the avoidance of doubt, a distinction ought to be drawn between bringing or filing an appeal and entering an appeal. As alluded to above, an appeal can only be brought or filed in the court below; order 3 Rule 5 of the court of Appeal Rules (supra). Whereas, an appeal shall be deemed to have been entered in the court when the relevant record of proceedings in the lower court has been duly transmitted to and received in the lower court has been duly transmitted to and received in the Registry of this court. See order 1 Rule 21 (1) of the court of Appeal Rules (supra); OYO STATE INEC V. AG OYO STATE (2006) ALL FWLR (part 334) 2017 paragraphs B-C." Per SAULAWA J.C.A (P 17,Paras A-D) |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - MISTAKE OF COUNSEL: Whether the sins of the counsel can be visited on the litigant |
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"However,most cherishingly, it is also a trite golden principle of law that the sin of counsel and nay court Registrar (as in the instant case) ought not be visited on the litigant, most particularly having due regard to the glaring fact that the appellants were not shown by the Respondent to have been personally guilty of any negligence. See LONG-JOHN V. BLAKK (supra) (1998) 59 LRCN 3864 at 3893 paragraphs H ? I." Per SAULAWA J.C.A (Pp 17-18,Paras G-A) |
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ORDER OR CERTIORARI OF PROHIBITION: Whether an order of certiorari or prohibition will lie where anybody or persons having legal authority to act fairly and judicially but have acted in excess or contrary to their legal authority |
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"It is trite principle of law that an administrative body or authority in ascertaining facts has a duty to act judicially notwithstanding that the proceedings thereof have none of the procedures or formalities of and are not conducted in accordance with the practice and procedure of court of law. As authoritatively held by the Supreme Court: "The modern concept which however, commends itself to us is that the duty placed on such a body is to act fair" per FATAYI WILLIAMS, JSC (supra) at page 633 paragraphs 40-45. Most undoubtedly, its also trite law that wherever any body or persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights (and obligations) of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially or fairly, act in excess or contrary to their legal authority, an order of certiorari or prohibition would lie. It does not matter whether such "body of persons having legal authority to determine question affecting the rights (and obligations) of subjects" is a judicial" or "administrative" tribunal. According to the Supreme court, in HART'S case (supra):- It is the same with individual officers (as in the instant case) discharging public functions (see R.V. BOYCOTT & ORS EXPARTE KEASLEY (1939) 2 K.B. 651), and to ministers of the crown such as in the case of the King v. Minister of Health Exparte Yatte (1930) 2 K.B. 98. (Per Bracket added). FATAYI WILLIAMS JSC (as he then was) at 634 paragraphs 10 15; see also R. V. ELECTRICITY COMMISSIONERS (1924) 1 K.B. R. V. ELECTRICITY COMMISSIONERS (1924) 1 K.B.171 at 204-205" Per SAULAWA J.C.A (Pp 23-24,Paras A-A) |
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING: Whether the word "person" as stated in section 36(1) of 1999 constitution denotes a living person as well as a juristic person |
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"Section 36 (1) of the 1999 constitution , (supra) which cherishingly provides inter alia that: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality. It may as well be posited that the word "person" as couched in the above section 361 (1) denotes a living person as well as juristic person; thus applicable to the Appellants as much as the respondent. It is trite that the well cherished principle of fair hearing is not merely a technical doctrine. It is rather one of substance.Undoubtedly, it is not the question of whether a party is entitled to be heard before a decision is reached; but rather whether the had, as a matter of act, been accorded an opportunity to be heard. See BAMAIYI V. THE STATE (21001) FWLR (part 46) 956 at 974 paragraphs D - E per WAIFO JSC, thus: "Once an appellate court comes to the conclusion that the party was entitled to be heard before, a decision was reached but was not given opportunity of hearing the order or judgment thus entered is bound to be set aside." See also KOTOYE V. CBN (1989) NWLR (part 98) 419; ATANO V. AG. BENDEL STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (part 75) 201; NTUKDEM V. OKO (1986) 5 NWLR (part 45) 909." Per SAULAWA J.C.A (Pp 18-19 Paras B-B) |
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IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA J.C.A (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Imo State holden at Owerri, dated 08/312001, Coram B. A. NJEMANZE, J; granting the Respondent's application for an order of certiorari, injunctive reliefs and consequential orders against the Appellants.
The Respondent was at all material times a civil servant of the Imo State Government. He was first employed in the year 1962 as a messenger: in the civil service of the defunct Eastern Nigerian Government and later East Central State.
In September, 1975, he gained an admission into the University bf Nsukka for an under graduate course. He applied for and was granted a study leave without pay for a period of four year. He graduated with a BSC (Hons.) in Political Science in 1979.
He later in l980 applied for and was given a fresh appointment on probation by the 1st Appellant. He served as Secretary of the Imo State Executive Council from 01/4/93 until he was purportedly retired in 1999 vide Exhibit AG8 which is to the effect that:
"Mr. G.O. Anuforom (Assistant Chief Administrative Officer) Exco Secretariat office of the secretary to the state Government Owerri RETIREMENT FROM THE IMO STATE GOVERNMENT SERVICE.
I am directed to convey the civil service commission's approval for you to retire from the Civil service with retrospective effect from 7th June 1997 after 35 years of service. This is on grounds of public interest in accordance with section 3 (i) (g) of the pensions Act of 1979.
2. Since the overstay was culpable on you, all salaries and allowances paid to you after 6th June, 1997 should be deducted en bloc from your gratuity.
3. In view of the above, you should surrender your duty and all items of Administrative officer in the Exco secretariat.
4. You are to submit your retirement/pension papers for necessary actions.
M.C. Ohale
For: Secretary to the State Government.
See page 20 of the Record. It is evident from the Record at page 19 that the Respondent had earlier in June, 1997 been issued with a notice of retirement dated 27/6/97 vide Exhibit AG6 which inter alia reads thus:
NOTICE ON RETIREMENT
I am directed to inform you that by the records in this office, you will retire from Imo State civil Service on completion of 35 meritorious services with effect from 6th December 1997. Under this consideration, you are expected to tender 6 month mandatory notice to enable this office process your papers promptly.
I am, Sir
Your obedient servant
A.C. Oguama
For: Secretary to the State Government.
In response to Exhibit AG8, the Respondent wrote a petition dated 21/9/99 (Exhibit A.G 9) to the Military Governor of Imo State complaining against what he termed "WRONGFUL RETIREMENT NFROM THE SERVICE OF IMO STATE GOVERNMENT".
See pages 22 - 30 of the record to the effect inter alia that:
8. My Summary
8.1 I have not served 35 years. I left for further studies in September 1975.When I came back in June 1980 I was not reabsorbed and I was not promoted by my former office, Ministry of Education, on the ground that my additional qualification did not grantee automatic promotion and in view of the fact that I ceased from being listed in the normal roll since 1975 and that I was not provided for in the Estimate.
8.2 As a result of 8.1.1 took up a fresh appointment with the civil service commission based on my application for fresh appointment on the form designated for fresh appointees by the commission.
8.3 Following my success at the public competitive examination I was offered an appointment with effect from 23rd December, 198A, six month after my return from the University, and with out employment I was placed on probationary conditions prior to my confirmation and advancement to G.1. 09.
8.4 When the policy of retirement after 35 years of services was adopted, I was erroneously grouped with those who had done 35 years from the first day of their appointment, without break and those who condoned their previous services. I did not condone my leaving the service for further studies.
Thus having been aggrieved by the retirement thereof from service of the, Imo State Government, the Respondent filed an application exparte (dated 07/10/2000) on 12/l0/2000 in the trial court praying for leave to apply for the following relief:
1. An order of certiorari removing to this Honourable court for the purpose of being quashed the letter SGI/A/P.273/552 dated 16th September, written by the 2nd Respondent to the applicant by which the applicant was purportedly retired from the civil service of Imo State.
An order of certiorari removing to this Honourable court for the purpose of being quashed any purported retirement or approval of the retirement of the applicant from the civil service of Imo State b1, the Ist Respondent as contained in letter by the 2nd Respondent to the Applicant viz ref.
SGI/A/P.275/552.
An order of court prohibiting the 1st and 2nd Respondents jointly and severally, or through any other officers of the government of Imo State, from retiring or purporting to retire the applicant from the service of Imo State on the ground of service for 35 years.
4. An order on the Respondents to restore the applicant to his office in the civil service Imo State and to pay to the applicant all emoluments due and the to applicant from September 1999 until the applicants restoration to his office in the civil service of Imo State.
5. An order of court that in compiling the applicants entitlement under relief No 4 above, account shall be taken of the applicant's promotion which was due 1998 and his 1999 commend promotion.
The exparte application inquestion was predicated on the following grounds:-
GROUNDS UPON WHICH RELIEFS ARE SOUGHT
1. The applicant was retired on grounds of public interest that is for cause under section 3 (i) (d of the pensions Act 1990 without being given opportunity for fair hearing contrary to the rules of natural justice: and section 36 (i) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
2. There is no existing law requiring the retirement of any civil servant on the ground of service for a period of 35 years.
3. The applicant has not attained the age of 60 years as provided for mandatory retirement under the pension Act 1990 applicable to Imo State.
See pages 2 -5 of the Record.
It's instructive that on 14/11/2000 the said exparte application was moved by the applicant's counsel and accordingly granted by the trial court thus:
RULING,
The application is granted. Leave is hereby granted to the Applicant to apply for an order of certiorari. The Applicant shall enter into a bond in the sum of N100, 000 securities to prosecute the case.
It is hereby ordered that all actions relating to this matter be stayed until the final determination of this case. The Respondents in particular are hereby restrained from doing anything whatsoever which may touch or affect this case until the final determination of the case. The substantive motion is fixed for 28/ 1/2000 for hearing.
See page 34 of the Record.
At the conclusion of the hearing of the submission of the parties learned counsel upon the substantive motion inquestion, the learned trial judge delivered the ruling thereof on 08/3/2001 to the effect, inter alia, that -
"In the circumstance the application succeeds. I hereby order that an order of certiorari be issued and it is hereby issued to quash the document Exhibit AG8 annexed to Exhibit "8" and its contents, and Exhibit AG 6 an annexed to Exhibit "B" and its contents.
I therefore make the following orders.
l. The letter Reference No SGl/A/P.273/552 of 16/9/99 and its contents, that is, Exhibit AG8 of Exhibit "B" are hereby quashed.
2. The letter Reference No SGI/P.275/552 of 27/6/97 and its content, that is Exhibit AG6 of Exhibit 'B' are hereby quashed.
3. the Applicant is to return to his employment as a civil servant as it letters reference Nos SG1/A/P.275/552 of 16/9/99 that is Exhibit AGs of Exhibit 'B' and SGI/A/P.275/552 of 27/6/97 that it: Exhibit AG6 of Exhibit 'B' never existed.
4. The Applicant is entitled to be paid all his salaries, allowances and emoluments due to him from September, 1999 when Exhibit AG I of Exhibit 'B' was written and it purportedly took effect, Reliefs Nos. 3 and 5 in the motion paper for the prohibition of the Respondents from retiring the-applicant from service on the ground of service for 35 years and also for the taking in to account of the applicants promotion in 1998 and 1999 command in computing his salaries, allowances and emoluments respectively are refused.
See pages 69 and 70 of the Record.
Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid ruling and consequential orders of the Trial court, the Appellants have filed this appeal which is predicted on three grounds. It is instructive that parties have filed, exchanged and accordingly adopted their respective Briefs of Argument.
In particular Appellants Brief (dated 27/6/06) was filed on 28/6/06. Three issues have been formulated therein, to wit:
(a) Whether the trial court was right in holding that this is a proper case for order of certiorari and that the letters -Exhibits AG 8 and AG 6 of Exhibit B are hereby quashed:
(b) Whether the court was right to suo motu extend the life of an application which was brought out of time with out any application for extension of time?
(c) Whether the trial court was right in holding that the Respondent, who had been retired on grounds of public interest under the pension Act, be restored to his office and for all his emolument to be paid.
On his own part, the Respondent has in the Brief thereof (dated l4/7/06) filed on 18/7/06, inter alia, raised a preliminary objection challenging the competence of the appeal on the ground that it "was not brought within time and is an abuse of the process of this Honourable court".
The Respondent has also identified 3 issues therein to wit:
"(a) whether the trial court was not right in holding that the certiorari was applicable in his case.
(b) Whether the trial court was not right in regularizing the application before it.
(c) Whether the order to pay Respondent's unpaid emoluments was not proper.
In response to the Respondent's brief, the Applicant filed a Reply Brief (dated 28/7/06) on 10/8/06. I have deemed it expedient to first deal with the issue of preliminary objection raised by the Respondent in the Brief thereof and replied thereto in the Appellant Reply Brief in question.
As it were, the argument of the learned senior counsel on the preliminary objection is predicated on the grounds that:
The purported appeal which is copied at pages 51-56 bears neither a date upon which it was signed nor a date upon which it was filed.
...the record of appeal was only signed on 15/5/2003 and the appeal number is CA/PH/191/2003.
Without more, his Honourable court is with respect, not in a position to presume that the notice of appeal came in to existence earlier than 2003 since appeal number is assigned upon transmission of the Notice of Appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal.
Appeal from a final decision of the High court lies to the court of Appeal within ninety days of delivery of the decision. In the absence of any date reasonable conclusion is that date of filing is unknown.
The only reference from available facts is that the Notice of Appeal could not have come in to existence prior to 2003,for a decision delivered on 8th March 2001 an appeal showing only a 2003 date on the face of the record of appeal with a 2003 appeal number, is out of time and incompetent and ought to be struck out. This Honourable court is urged to strike out the purported appeal.
2. REPLY TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
2.01 The Appellants humbly submit that the Appeal filed in this court is competent for the following reasons:
(a) Judgment was delivered in this suit in the lower court on 8th March 2001, the Appellant filed their Notice of Appeal in the court below within time the counsel who prepared the Notice did not include any date and the court official who assessed it did not insert the date of filing (page 56 of the Record). The Notice of Appeal however, was exhibited in the motion for stay of Execution filed in the lower court on 22no March, 2001. This is at pages 71 -75 of the records. There is therefore a presumption that the Notice of Appeal was filed before or on 22nd March, 2001.
(b) The date the record of appeal was signed and the appeal numbers (stated in paragraph 2.01 of Respondents Brief) with humility can not be used to determine when the Notice of Appeal was filed.
(c)The summons to parties by Registrar to settle Record and the settlement of Record are at pages 76 and 77 of the record.
(d) It is trite that appeal is deemed to have been brought when the Notice of Appeal has been filed in the Registry of the court below; order 3 Rule 5, Court of Appeal Rules.
(e) It is the duty of the Registrar of the court below under order 3 Rule 8, court of Appeal Rules, to enclose on the Notice of Appeal the fees, receipt number and the date of payment and to transmit the record of appeal to the court of Appeal.
(f) It is the Registrar of the court that enters the appeal in the cause list order 3 Rule I3 (2). The Honourable court is most humbly urged to hold that the Notice of Appeal was filed on 22nd March 2001. We most humbly urge the court not to punish the Appellants for the mistake of the court registry or the carelessness, negligence or in advertence of counsel. AG FEDERATION V. AJAYI (2002) 12 NWLR (part 682) 809; LONG-JOHN V. BLACK (1998) LRCN 3854, at 3893 (i). The Appellants have not been shown to have been guilty of any negligence.
It is humbly submitted that the appeal was brought within time; it is competent and not an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court.
I have accorded an ample regard upon the submissions of the two learned counsel and vis-a-vis, he record of proceedings of the trial court. There is no doubt that the Notice of Appeal contained in pages 51 - 56 of the Record is neither dated nor carries the date on which it was supposedly filed in the lower courts Registry. There is, however a sufficient proof to show that it was received and fees paid therefore duly assessed at a total of N70.00 by the Registrar of the court below, Thus, as admitted by the learned Assistant Director the omission to insert the dates was entirely the fault of the counsel that drafted the Notice of Appeal and the Registrar of the court below that assessed and processes same. As rightly alluded to by the learned Assistant Director the copies of the said Notice of Appeal had earlier been exhibited in the Motion for stay of execution which was filed in the lower court on 22/3/2001.See pages 71-75 of the Record. Thus, this lends credence to a presumption that the Notice or Appeal was filed on or before the said 22/3/2001. The intentions of the learned senior Advocate that the said Notice of Appeal could not have come into existence earlier than 2003 is, with due respect no doubt fallacious.
It is trite that by virtue of order 3 Rule 5 of the court of Appeal Rule, 2002, an appeal shall be deemed to have been duly brought when the notice of appeal has been filed in the Registry of the court below. For the avoidance of doubt, a distinction ought to be drawn between bringing or filing an appeal and entering an appeal. As alluded to above, an appeal can only be brought or filed in the court below; order 3 Rule 5 of the court of Appeal Rules (supra). Whereas, an appeal shall be deemed to have been entered in the court when the relevant record of proceedings in the lower court has been duly transmitted to and received in the lower court has been duly transmitted to and received in the Registry of this court. See order 1 Rule 21 (1) of the court of Appeal Rules (supra); OYO STATE INEC V. AG OYO STATE (2006) ALL FWLR (part 334) 2017 paragraphs B-C.
It is rather obvious that the omission regarding the dates on inquestion on the face of the Notice of Appeal was attributable to the negligence of both the Appellants counsel and the lower courts Registry. I am not unaware of the firm stand of this court and nay the Supreme Court that "Rules of court are meant to be complied with". See SOLANKE v. SOMEFUN (1974) JSC 141 at 141; NNEJI V. CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR (part 81)184; NDUKA V. APPIO (1993) 5 NWLR (part 292) 201. However,most cherishingly, it is also a trite golden principle of law that the sin of counsel and nay court Registrar (as in the instant case) ought not be visited on the litigant, most particularly having due regard to the glaring fact that the appellants were not shown by the Respondent to have been personally guilty of any negligence. See LONG-JOHN V. BLAKK (supra) (1998) 59 LRCN 3864 at 3893 paragraphs H - I.
To hold otherwise would, in my opinion amount to breaching the right to fair hearing accorded the Appellant under Section 36 (1) of the 1999 constitution , (supra) which cherishingly provides inter alia that:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.
It may as well be posited that the word "person" as couched in the above section 361 (1) denotes a living person as well as juristic person; thus applicable to the Appellants as much as the respondent. It is trite that the well cherished principle of fair hearing is not merely a technical doctrine. It is rather one of substance.Undoubtedly, it is not the question of whether a party is entitled to be heard before a decision is reached; but rather whether the had, as a matter of act, been accorded an opportunity to be heard. See BAMAIYI V. THE STATE (21001) FWLR (part 46) 956 at 974 paragraphs D - E per WAIFO JSC, thus:
"Once an appellate court comes to the conclusion that the party was entitled to be heard before, a decision was reached but was not given opportunity of hearing the order or judgment thus entered is bound to be set aside."
See also KOTOYE V. CBN (1989) NWLR (part 98) 419; ATANO V. AG. BENDEL STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (part 75) 201; NTUKDEM V. OKO (1986) 5 NWLR (part 45) 909. Thus, in the light of the foregoing postulations. I have no hesitation whatsoever in h preliminary objection is unmeritorious and it's accordingly hereby discountenanced.
Having contrasted the 3 issue formulated by the Appellants Brief with those of the Respondents, I have had very little, in any, difficulty in appreciating that they are not at all at cross purposes. I have thus deemed it appropriate to adopt 3 issues formulated by the Appellants for the purpose of determining this appeal; after all it's their own appeal. See GUDA V. KITTA (1991) 12 NWLR (Part 629) 21.
ISSUE NO 1:
"Whether the Trial Court was right in holding that this is a proper case for order of certiorari and that the letters Exhibit AG8 and AG6 of Exhibit B are hereby quashed"
It is said that this issue covers ground one of the Grounds of Appeal.
Reference was made by the learned Appellants counsel to sections 207 and 318 of the 1gggconstitution (supra) conferring delegatory powers to the 1st Appellant and defining the term "Civil service of the state" respectively' That' the trial judge was wrong in holding that certiorari lies to quash Exhibit AG8 annexed to Exhibit 'B' and its contents and Exhibit AG6 annexed thereto; see pages 19 and 21 of the Record.
It's contended that in making Exhibits AG8 and AG6, the 2nd Appellant was not under any duty to act judicially. See ARZIKA V. GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN REGION (1961-) ALL NLR (part 1- iv) 379.That, no grounds were established by Respondent's counsel to warrant the granting of an order of certiorari, which allegedly does not even apply in the instant case. Reference was made to STATE V. THE PRESIDENT GRADE 'A' CUSTOMARY COURT OYO EXPARTE ALIMOTU ATOKE (1967) NMLR 269 CIVIL SFRVICE PROCEDURE IN NIGERIA, by FIDELIS NWADIALO, 2nd Edition, at page 1056 regarding grounds essential for the grant of order of certiorari.
Counsel submitted that in an application for certiorari, it is the legality, not the correctness of the action that is looked at. See GOVERNOR OYO STATE & ORS v. FOLAYAN & ORS (1995) 8NWLR (part 413) 292 ar322- 323 paragraphs H - B. That the trial judge was wrong in holding that Exhibit AG8 did not emanate from the 1st Appellant. See section 207, 1999 constitution which empowers the 1st appellant to any officer or body in Government.
See also section 133 (a) and 134 (1) of the Federation 1990.
The court is thus urged to allow the appeal on this ground.
On the other hand, the submission of the learned senior counsel on issue No 1 is inter alia, to the effect that its clear that the Appellants are disputing the competence of the trial court to grant the relief of certiorari in a circumstance of an administrative act and not the propriety of the order itself. According to the learned senior counsel:
The notion of certiorari being limited to judicial or quasi judicial acts is now an absolute legal concept. This is because since 1976 the supreme court of Nigeria has through the case of A.K HART V. MILITARY GOVERNOR of rivers state (1976) 11sc 211 imported in to Nigeria law the modern concept of the applicability of certiorari to non judicial act.
It was thus contended that both the 1st and 2nd Appellants are subject to an order of certiorari; as it can not be argued that both do not need to act fairly in deciding whether or not the Respondent ought to be retired. It was contended further that HARTS case (supra) is apposite to the retired "in the public interest' on the state.
Again, it was argued that Exhibits AG6 and AG8 emanated from the 2nd Appellant whose office is provided for under section 208 (2) (a) of the 1999 constitution (supra): that it's clear from the provision of the constitution that the 2nd Appellant is excluded from the category of offers to whom the 1st Appellant could delegate its functions to appoint in to or dismiss from or exercise disciplinary control over persons employed in the civil service of a state. That, there is even no evidence on record that the 1st Appellant did in fact delegate its function to the 2nd Appellant. That, reference to Exhibit G8 as approval by the 1st Appellant is no evidence of authorization of 2nd to do the act since the act would logically have taken place before an approval would arise. Further references were made in that regard to WILSON v. AG BENDEL STATE (1985) 2 SC 191 at 192; KATTA V. CEN (1991) 9 NWLR (part 214) 126 at 146 B-E
It is urged that the learned trial judge was right when he held that the 2nd Appellant had no competence to retire the Respondent. The court is thus urged to resolve issue No 1 in the affirmative, dismissed ground one of the grounds of appeal and the appeal itself.
The Appellants in the Reply Brief thereof are however of the view